My research interests broadly include metaphysics, ontology, language, and their various intersections, for example theories of meaning, truth-making, and material adequacy. As such, I've become increasingly interested in grounding and other topics of "formal ontology", such as mereology, mereotopology, the philosophy of location, and mapmaking.

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My current research primarily concerns the nature of composition, identity, composition-as-identity, many-one identity, and plural logic. I'm interested in how concept-relative or count-relative accounts of cardinality ascription can used to make non-trivial many-one identity claims plausible. I argue that an object's cardinality holds only relative to a parameter like concept or way of counting and because of this, an object can be both a single thing and many things. Nevertheless, an object's cardinality can be analyzed mereologically.

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While looking at one and the same external phenomenon, I can say with
equal truth both “It is a copse” and “It is five trees”, or both “Here are four companies” and “Here are 500 men”. Now what changes here from one judgement to the other is neither any individual object, nor the whole, the agglomeration of them, but rather my terminology. But that is itself only a sign that one concept has been substituted for another.​

(Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Section 46)